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Chapter 1 Introduction1

1.1 The Purpose and Scope of the Study3

1.2 Research Methods4

Chapter 2 Introduction to the WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: An International Law Perspective7

2.1 Why the Law of State Responsibility Matters in the GATT/WTO Context8

2.2 Panel and Appellate Body's Recommendations and Rulings11

2.3 Cessation and Non-repetition12

2.4 Reparation13

2.4.1 Restitution14

2.4.1.1 GATT 1947 Practice15

2.4.1.2 WTO Practice16

2.4.2 Compensation19

2.4.2.1 Peculiarities of GATT/WTO Compensation20

2.4.2.2 GATT 1947 Practice21

2.4.2.3 WTO Practice22

2.4.2.4 Monetary Compensation in the GATT/WTO22

2.4.3 Satisfaction25

2.5 Countermeasures26

2.5.1 The Legal Nature26

2.5.2 The Status in the Remedies System27

2.5.3 Purposes28

2.5.3.1 Inducement of Compliance28

2.5.3.2 Re-balancing of the Benefits29

2.5.3.3 Do These Purposes Coexist?31

2.5.3.4 Compensation33

2.5.4 The Content33

2.5.5 ‘Curbed' Unilateralism35

2.5.5.1 The Principle of Multilateralism35

2.5.5.2 Prohibition of Non-authorized Unilateral Retaliation36

2.5.5.3 Prohibition of the Threat of Retaliation?38

2.5.5.3.1 Publication of Retaliation Lists39

2.5.5.3.2 Suspension of Customs Liquidation40

2.5.6 The Proportionality Principle42

2.5.6.1 The Proportionality Principle versus Inducement Effect44

2.5.7 Applicability of the Law of State Responsibility to WTO Retaliation45

2.6 Concluding Remarks47

Chapter 3 Retaliation under GATT 1947 and the DSU49

3.1 The Evolution of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism50

3.1.1 The GATT 1947 Dispute Settlement Mechanism50

3.1.1.1 GATT 1947 Articles ⅩⅩⅡand ⅩⅩⅢ50

3.1.1.2 Other Main Instruments on Dispute Settlement51

3.1.2 The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism52

3.1.2.1 The DSU53

3.1.2.2 Institutions and Procedures53

3.2 Retaliation in the Pre-WTO Dispute Settlement System55

3.2.1 The Havana Charter56

3.2.2 GATT 194756

3.2.2.1 The ‘Serious Enough' Requirement56

3.2.2.2 The Appropriateness Standard57

3.2.3 Other Instruments and Practice58

3.2.3.1 Prima Facie Nullification or Impairment58

3.2.3.2 The Case of Developing Countries59

3.2.4 Retaliation Practice59

3.2.4.1 Case Study: United States Import Restrictions on Dairy Products60

3.2.4.1.1 Factual Background60

3.2.4.1.2 Findings60

3.2.4.1.3 Assessment61

3.3 Retaliation under the DSU62

3.3.1 Three-Stage Retaliation65

3.3.2 Cross-Retaliation67

3.3.2.1 Whether Suspension Is Not Practicable or Not Effective68

3.3.2.2 ‘The Importance of Such Trade'70

3.3.2.3 ‘The Broader Economic Elements' and ‘The Broader Economic Consequences'71

3.3.2.4 ‘The Circumstances are Serious Enough'71

3.3.2.5 Application of the Requirements in Practice72

3.3.3 ProceduralIssues74

3.3.3.1 The Mandate of Arbitrators under DSU Article 2274

3.3.3.1.1 Article 22.674

3.3.3.1.2 Article 22.775

3.3.3.2 Burden of Proof76

3.3.3.2.1 General Remarks76

3.3.3.2.2 DSU Article 2277

3.3.3.2.3 The Duty to Cooperate78

3.3.3.3 Third-Party Rights under DSU Article 2278

3.3.3.4 Sufficiency of a Retaliation Request79

3.3.3.4.1 The Minimum Requirements79

3.3.3.4.2 Other Elements of the Request ‘Specificity'80

3.3.3.5 Identification of Concessions/Obligations in a Retaliation Request81

3.3.3.6 The Scope of Target Products81

3.3.3.7 Treatment of Confidential Information82

3.3.3.8 Opening Arbitration Hearings to the Public83

3.3.4 Substantive Issues84

3.3.4.1 ‘Nullification or Impairment'84

3.3.4.1.1 The Concept of ‘Nullification or Impairment'84

3.3.4.1.2 ‘Nullification or Impairment' versus‘Violation'85

3.3.4.1.3 Nullification or Impairment as a Result of Legislation ‘as Such’‘/as Applied'85

3.3.4.2 ‘Chilling Effect' of a Violation86

3.3.4.3 The Equivalence Standard87

3.3.4.3.1 General Considerations87

3.3.4.3.2 Qualitative or Quantitative Equivalence88

3.3.4.4 Indirect Benefits89

3.3.4.5 A Point in Time Used for Calculations89

3.3.4.6 Suspension of TRIPS Agreement Obligations90

3.4 Concluding Remarks93

Chapter 4 Retaliation under the SCM Agreement95

4.1 Introduction to the SCM Agreement95

4.2 Retaliation against Prohibited Subsidies96

4.2.1 The Scope of ‘Prohibited Subsidies'96

4.2.2 Special Procedures and Sui Generis Remedies97

4.2.3 Procedural Issues98

4.2.3.1 The Mandate of Arbitrators under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement98

4.2.4 Substantive Issues98

4.2.4.1 ‘Countermeasures'98

4.2.4.2 ‘Appropriate Countermeasures'99

4.2.4.2.1 Restrained Flexibility100

4.2.4.2.2 Non-disproportionateness100

4.2.4.2.3 Compliance-Inducing Effect101

4.2.4.3 Legal Justification of the ‘Violation Value' Approach102

4.2.4.3.1 Comparison with Article 22 of the DSU102

4.2.4.3.2 Comparison with Articles 7 and 9 of the SCM Agreement103

4.2.4.3.3 The Erga Omnes Partes Obligation103

4.2.4.4 The ‘Qualitative' Element105

4.2.4.4.1 ‘The Gravity of the Internationally Wrongful Act'105

4.2.4.4.2 ‘The Rights in Question'106

4.2.4.5 Punitive Countermeasures?107

4.3 Retaliation against Actionable Subsidies108

4.3.1 The Scope of ‘Actionable Subsidies'108

4.3.2 Special Procedures and Sui Generis Remedies109

4.3.3 The Commensurateness Standard110

4.4 Concluding Remarks112

Chapter 5 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation113

5.1 Statistical Overview of WTO Retaliation Practice114

5.2 Retaliation under DSU Article 22: The ‘Economic/Trade Effects' Approach116

5.2.1 The ‘Actual/Counterfactual' Method117

5.2.1.1 EC —Bananas Ⅲ （US/Ecuador） （Article 22.6 —EC）118

5.2.1.1.1 Factual Background118

5.2.1.1.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation: US Request119

5.2.1.1.3 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation: Ecuador's Request120

5.2.1.1.4 Assessment121

5.2.1.1.5 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation122

5.2.1.2 EC —Hormones （Canada/US） （Article 22.6 —EC）122

5.2.1.2.1 Factual Background122

5.2.1.2.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation123

5.2.1.2.3 Assessment124

5.2.1.2.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation125

5.2.1.3 US —Gambling （Article 22.6 —US）126

5.2.1.3.1 Factual Background126

5.2.1.3.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation127

5.2.1.3.3 Assessment130

5.2.1.3.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation131

5.2.2 The ‘Future Factors' Method131

5.2.2.1 US —1916 Act （EC） （Article 22.6 —US）132

5.2.2.1.1 Factual Background132

5.2.2.1.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation132

5.2.2.1.3 Assessment134

5.2.2.1.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation135

5.2.3 The ‘Economic Modelling' Method135

5.2.3.1 US —Offset Act （Byrd Amendment）（Article 22.6 —US）135

5.2.3.1.1 Factual Background135

5.2.3.1.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation136

5.2.3.1.3 Assessment138

5.2.3.1.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation139

5.3 Retaliation under SCM Agreement Article 4.10: The ‘Violation Value' Approach139

5.3.1 The ‘Financial-Contribution-Based' Method140

5.3.1.1 US —FSC （Article 22.6 —US）140

5.3.1.1.1 Factual Background140

5.3.1.1.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation141

5.3.1.1.3 Assessment142

5.3.1.1.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation143

5.3.2 The ‘Benefit-Based' Method143

5.3.2.1 Brazil —Aircraft （Article 22.6 —Brazil）144

5.3.2.1.1 Factual Background144

5.3.2.1.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation145

5.3.2.1.3 Assessment146

5.3.2.1.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation146

5.3.2.2 Canada —Aircraft Credits and Guarantees（Article 22.6 —Canada）146

5.3.2.2.1 Factual Background146

5.3.2.2.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation147

5.3.2.2.3 Assessment148

5.3.2.2.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation149

5.4 Concluding Remarks149

Chapter 6 The WTO Retaliation System: Problems and Solutions153

6.1 The DSU Review154

6.2 Procedural Problems155

6.2.1 The Pre-retaliation Stage155

6.2.1.1 The ‘Sequencing' Issue155

6.2.1.1.1 WTO Case Law156

6.2.1.1.2 Ad Hoc Agreements by the Disputing Parties157

6.2.1.1.3 Proposals for a Permanent Solution158

6.2.2 The Post-retaliation Stage160

6.2.2.1 ‘Carousel' Retaliation160

6.2.2.1.1 WTO Case Law160

6.2.2.1.2 Is ‘Carousel' Retaliation Legal?162

6.2.2.1.3 Proposals on ‘Carousel' Retaliation163

6.2.2.2 Termination of Retaliation164

6.2.3 The Transparency Issue165

6.3 The Matter of Efficacy167

6.3.1 Early Determination and Application of Nullification or Impairment168

6.3.2 Retroactive Retaliation169

6.3.3 Collective Retaliation171

6.3.4 Negotiable Retaliation173

6.3.5 Increasing the Level of Retaliation over Time175

6.3.6 Unconditional Cross-Retaliation176

6.3.7 More Extensive Use of Compensation177

6.3.7.1 Preauthorized Compensation: Contingent Liberalization Commitments177

6.3.7.2 Monetary Compensation178

6.4 Concluding Remarks180

Chapter 7 Conclusion181

Appendix 1 The Concept of Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System185

Appendix 2 State of Play in WTO Retaliation Practice （1 January 1995—1 August 2008）187

Appendix 3 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts197

Appendix 4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade213

Appendix 5 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes215

Appendix 6 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures243

Appendix 7Working Procedures for Arbitration Pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU257

Bibliography259

Table of Cases277

Index285